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Decisions are often associated with a degree of cer-
tainty, or confidence—an estimate of the probability
that the chosen option will be correct. Recent neuro-
physiological results suggest that the central pro-
cessing of evidence leading to a perceptual decision
also establishes a level of confidence. Here we pro-
vide a causal test of this hypothesis by electrically
stimulating areas of the visual cortex involved in
motion perception. Monkeys discriminated the
direction of motion in a noisy display andwere some-
times allowed to opt out of the direction choice if their
confidence was low. Microstimulation did not reduce
overall confidence in the decision but instead altered
confidence in a manner that mimicked a change in
visual motion, plus a small increase in sensory noise.
The results suggest that the same sensory neural sig-
nals support choice, reaction time, and confidence in
a decision and that artificial manipulation of these
signals preserves the quantitative relationship be-
tween accumulated evidence and confidence.
INTRODUCTION
Decision making refers to the process of deliberating toward a
commitment to a proposition, hypothesis, or plan of action.
Although decisions have a discrete, all or none character—
true or false, left or right, option D—they are also associated
with a degree of belief that the decision will turn out to be cor-
rect. This graded scale of choice certainty, or confidence,
affects the way we express our decisions (forcefully or reserv-
edly) and learn from our mistakes and successes. Confidence
is critically important when making interrelated decisions
without immediate feedback, or when reasoning about a
sequence of choices vicariously (Tolman, 1948). For these
and other reasons, psychologists have counted confidence
among the three main observables of choice behavior (Vickers,
1979), along with the outcome of the decision (correct or incor-
rect; i.e., accuracy) and the time needed to complete it (reac-
tion time [RT]).The neural basis of assigning confidence in a decision is not
well understood, in part because it is difficult to study in animal
models. Recently, methods have been introduced that allow an-
imals to report their confidence, often in the form of a postdeci-
sion wager (PDW) (Foote and Crystal, 2007; Hampton, 2001;
Kepecs et al., 2008; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Middlebrooks
and Sommer, 2011; Smith et al., 2008). In one type of PDW,
animals indicate their degree of certainty by opting out of the
primary behavioral report when a decision is less likely to be
successful, instead choosing a guaranteed but smaller (or less
preferred) reward (Foote and Crystal, 2007; Hampton, 2001;
Kiani and Shadlen, 2009). Monkeys exercise this ‘‘sure-bet’’ op-
tion more frequently when the trial is difficult, and they are more
accurate when the sure bet is offered and waived versus when it
is not offered. This improvement holds within a particular level of
stimulus difficulty and even for identical replays of the same stim-
ulus (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009). It suggests that the decision to
accept the sure bet is based on an assessment of the reliability
of internal sensory evidence, rather than on a simple association
with trial difficulty or some property of the stimulus (Smith et al.,
2012).
A recent study (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009) reported the activity
of decision-related neurons in the lateral intraparietal area (LIP)
recorded while monkeys performed a direction discrimination
task with PDW. They found that these neurons—previously
shown to represent a decision variable (DV) that explains choice
and RT (Gold and Shadlen, 2007)—also reflect the degree of
confidence in the choice. The results raised the possibility of a
common neural mechanism underlying choice, RT, and confi-
dence. This hypothesis makes a clear prediction: if the repre-
sentation of accumulated evidence used to guide a perceptual
decision also supports a degree of confidence in that decision,
then a causal manipulation of the evidence will affect PDW in a
manner predictable from the effect on choices.
Here we test this hypothesis using electrical microstimulation
(mS). Previous studies showed that mS of direction-selective neu-
rons in the macaque visual cortex during a direction discrimina-
tion task causes monkeys to choose the preferred direction of
neurons near the electrode tip more often (Salzman et al.,
1990, 1992) and more rapidly (Ditterich et al., 2003). These ef-
fects on choice and RT can be quantified as an equivalent
change in the motion strength, as though the stimulation effec-
tively added to the visual evidence supporting the preferred
direction. Thus, a change in PDW commensurate with the shiftNeuron 83, 797–804, August 20, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 797
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Figure 1. Postdecision Wagering Reflects Confidence in the Motion
Decision
(A) Postdecision wagering (PDW) task sequence (see Experimental Pro-
cedures). Red spots indicate direction targets; blue spot is the ‘‘sure-bet’’
target (Ts). (B) Probability of choosing Ts as a function of viewing duration and
motion strength (color coded). Combined data from no-mS trials for two
monkeys (n = 26,924 trials). Solid traces are runningmeans (proportions) of the
data sorted by viewing duration. Dashed traces in all panels are fits to the
bounded accumulation model (see text and Figure 4). (C) Improvement in
decision accuracy on no-mS trials when the sure bet was offered but waived.
Solid traces are running means using all nonzero coherences and directions.
(D) Same format as (C) but broken down by motion strength (absolute value of
coherence) and pooled across viewing durations. Symbols indicate the
mean ± SE.
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Effects of MT Microstimulation on Choice Certaintyof the choice function would support the idea that the same sen-
sory signals underlie both the choice and the confidence associ-
ated with it. On the other hand, since choice and confidence are
known to be dissociated in a variety of settings (Del Cul et al.,
2009; Drugowitsch et al., 2014; Kahneman et al., 1982; Komura
et al., 2013; Lau and Passingham, 2006; Rahnev et al., 2012;
Rounis et al., 2010), we might expect artificial stimulation to
induce a discrepancy between the two. Indeed, the effect of
mS on neuronal circuits is unlike anything elicited through natural
vision (Histed et al., 2009; Logothetis et al., 2010). Nonetheless,
here we show that mS affects confidence much like a change in
the visual stimulus, consistent with a common mechanism char-
acterized by bounded accumulation of evidence.
RESULTS
We trained two rhesus monkeys on a two-alternative direction
discrimination task with PDW (Figure 1A; Experimental Proce-
dures). The monkeys were required to decide between the direc-
tion preferred by neurons near the stimulating electrode and the
opposite ‘‘null’’ direction and to indicate this choice after a mem-
ory delay. Monkeys were rewarded for correct choices and
randomly on the neutral (0% coherence) stimulus. During the
memorydelay, themonkeywassometimesoffereda thirdalterna-
tive (the sure-bet target [Ts]) to opt out of the high-stakes direction
decision and receive a guaranteed but smaller reward. Monkeys798 Neuron 83, 797–804, August 20, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.choseTsmore frequently for shorter viewingdurationsandweaker
motion strengths (Figure 1B) and showed greater accuracy on
waived-Ts trials compared to when Ts was unavailable (Figures
1C and 1D). Figure 1C also reveals a saturation in performance
with longer viewing durations, suggesting a bounded accumula-
tion process (Kiani et al., 2008; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009).
On half of all trials, electrical mS (5–10 mA) was applied to area
MTorMST during the presentation of randomdotmotion. Impor-
tantly, the presence or absence of mS did not alter the designa-
tion of correct and incorrect trials. Thus, if microstimulation of
rightward preferring neurons were to cause the monkey to
answer ‘‘right’’ on a trial in which leftward motion was shown,
this would be regarded as an error, hence unrewarded.
Does Microstimulation Affect the Degree
of Confidence?
Since microstimulation induces an artificial pattern of activity in
the brain, we wondered whether monkeys would simply opt
out of the direction decision on mS trials when given this oppor-
tunity. The answer is resoundingly negative. As shown in Fig-
ure 2A, monkeys varied their propensity to choose Ts from
session to session, but such variation was highly correlated on
mS and no-mS trials (Pearson’s r = 0.88, p < 1020). Averaged
within individual experiments, monkeys did not opt out more
frequently on mS trials; indeed, the trend favors a small decrease
in Ts choices (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures avail-
able online). The key point is that mS did not cause indiscriminate
uncertainty about perceptual judgments, or we would have
observed the opposite trend (more Ts choices on mS trials).
Although the average frequency of Ts choices was similar on
mS and no-mS trials, microstimulation nevertheless exerted a
substantial effect on confidence judgments, corresponding to
a shift of the bell-shaped function along the motion axis (Fig-
ure 2B, top). Notice that for both mS and no-mS trials, the monkey
accepted the sure bet most often for the stimulus conditions that
led to the most equivocal choice proportions (i.e., 0.5 preferred-
direction choices; Figure 2B, bottom). Across sessions, the shift
of the sure-bet function was highly correlated with the shift of the
choice function (Pearson’s r = 0.87, p < 1018; Figure S1A). This
close association, despite the wide range of magnitudes of both
effects, is consistent with the idea that a common neural signal
underlies choice and confidence.
Another way to frame this result is to consider each motion di-
rection separately. For motion in the preferred direction (positive
coherence), monkeys chose the sure bet less often when mSwas
present (two-proportion z test, p < 1018), suggesting that mS
increased confidence by reinforcing the evidence from the visual
stimulus. In contrast, for motion in the null direction (negative
coherence) monkeys chose the sure bet more often when mS
was present (p < 109), suggesting that mS decreased confi-
dence by contradicting the evidence for null-direction motion.
The end result is a leftward shift of the curve, as if mS had injected
a signal largely equivalent to a change in motion coherence.
Lastly, Figure 2B (top) clarifies the subtle decrease in the number
of Ts choices accompanying mS (noted above), which is most
evident at the peaks of the sure-bet functions. We will explain
this apparent increase in confidence using the model described
below.
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Figure 2. Effects of mS on PDW and Perceptual Decisions
(A) The proportion of trials in which the monkey opted out of the direction task
and chose the sure bet, comparing mS and no-mS trials (n = 63 sites). (B) Top:
proportion of sure-bet (Ts) choices as a function of motion strength (percent
coherence; positive = preferred direction of neurons at the stimulation site) for
all sessions in both monkeys (n = 53,134 trials). Red and blue data points
indicate mS and no-mS trials, respectively, combining across all viewing du-
rations. Error bars (SE) are smaller than the data points. Top, inset: proportion
Ts choices in separate control sessions, for trials with (red) and without (blue)
an offset added to the motion coherence in lieu of mS (‘‘Dcoh,’’ see text and
Figure S3). Bottom: proportion of preferred-direction choices as a function of
motion strength, plotted separately for the four conditions of the 23 2 design:
mS present (red) or absent (blue), and Ts offered but waived (solid curves and
filled symbols) or Ts not offered (dashed curves and open symbols). In both
panels, smooth curves represent fits to the bounded evidence-accumulation
model (see text), with the exception of the red solid and dashed curves in the
bottom panel. These are the predicted mS choice functions based on a fit to the
remaining observations. (C) Comparison of the effect of mS on choices (rep-
resented as an equivalent change in motion strength) on trials with and without
the Ts option.
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Effects of MT Microstimulation on Choice CertaintyMicrostimulation combined with PDW yields four choice
functions: ±mS when the sure bet was not offered and ±mS
when the monkey could have opted out but instead chose the
preferred or null direction of the stimulated neurons. These four
conditions are represented by the four curves in the bottom of
Figure 2B. There are three salient observations. First, mS shifted
the choice function by the same amount whether or not Ts was
available, and this similarity was apparent across the 63 sites
(Figure 2C; paired t test, p = 0.56). If on some trials mS had
affected confidence in a manner unlike a change in visual evi-
dence, its effect on choicesmight have been different depending
on whether the monkey had the chance to opt out of such trials.
The results did not support this possibility. Second, mS reduced
monkeys’ sensitivity to motion, consistent with previous studies
(Ditterich et al., 2003; Salzman et al., 1992). This is only apparent
as a subtle attenuation in the slope of the red curves compared
with their blue (no-mS) counterparts, but the effect is reliable
(17% ± 2% change, p < 1016, logistic regression; Equation 2).It suggests that mS occasionally weakened the directional signal
and/or added a small amount of noise to the decision process.
As shown below, an increase in noise can also explain the small
decrease in the maximum rate of Ts choices on mS trials. Third
andmost importantly, mS did not abolish the improved sensitivity
to motion on trials when Ts was available but waived, as indi-
cated by the steeper slope of the solid compared to the dashed
curves (Figure 2B, bottom; logistic regression, p < 1024 for both
mS and no-mS conditions tested separately). Recall that this
improvement is a sign that the monkey evaluated the reliability
of the evidence and communicated its direction choice when
the reliability seemed high (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009). Its pres-
ence on mS trials implies that such evaluation of evidence is not
compromisedby artificiallymanipulating the sensory representa-
tion. It also means that mS did not simply compel the monkey to
choose the preferred direction with some probability, irrespec-
tive of the state of the perceptual evidence. Rather, it exerted
its effects by changing the available evidence for the decision.
Controls: High-Current Stimulation and a Visual
Perturbation
The data presented thus far suggest that mS does not reduce
the monkey’s overall degree of certainty but instead resembles
a change in visual motion. However, it is possible that the
absence of an increase in the overall frequency of Ts choices
on mS trials was due to the monkey’s inability or unwillingness
to choose Ts beyond some rate throughout the experiment.
One way to test this possibility is to apply a mS condition that
impairs discrimination performance (e.g., by deliberately weak-
ening the differential directional signals underlying choice). This
kind of impairment can be achieved simply by increasing the
current amplitude, thus activating indiscriminately a larger pop-
ulation of neurons with a broad distribution of preferred direc-
tions (Murasugi et al., 1993). Thus, at eight sites, after
completing a block of trials with standard low-amplitude pulses
(7.5 mA), we began a second block with 75 mA pulses while
keeping all other parameters identical. High-current mS reduced
the monkey’s sensitivity to motion (logistic regression, p <
1019; Figure 3B) and also led to a greater proportion of Ts
choices (no-mS = 0.45 ± 0.01; mS = 0.49 ± 0.02; p < 0.05; Fig-
ure 3A). The latter effect can be described as primarily a
widening, rather than a shift, of the sure-bet function, driven
by a pronounced increase in Ts choices for the highest motion
strengths. The result implies that PDW does not lack the power
to expose a decrease in confidence, and it reinforces the notion
that decision accuracy and confidence are linked. Indeed this
link was also present in the main experiments: across sessions,
flatter choice functions were associated with wider sure-bet
functions (Spearman’s rank correlation, r = 0.55, p < 105),
and the modest changes in these two metrics caused by low-
current stimulation were correlated (r = 0.37, p < 0.004; see
Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
In a second control experiment, instead of stimulating the
brain electrically on half the trials, we manipulated the visual
stimulus in a manner that mimics the hypothesized effect of
mS. We reasoned that if the brain interprets mS like a change
in motion strength, we should approximate the effects of mS
on choice and PDW by simply adding an offset to the motionNeuron 83, 797–804, August 20, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 799
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Figure 3. Stimulation with High Current Disrupts Both Accuracy and
Confidence
(A and B) Combined data from eight experiments using 75 mA stimulation (n =
4,483 trials). Same conventions as Figure 2B. Smooth curves are best fits of
the extended model described in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures
(see also Figure S2).
Figure 4. Bounded Evidence Accumulation Model Explains PDW
and Effects of mS
(A) Colored traces represent the accumulation of noisy motion evidence (i.e.,
from MT/MST) on three individual (simulated) trials. Evidence is drawn from a
Gaussian distribution with mean (R) proportional to motion strength and SD (s)
equal to 1. Decision formation terminates when the stimulus is turned off (green
and blue trials) or when the accumulated evidence (the decision variable, x)
reaches a bound at ±B (red trial). (B) The model prescribes a sure-bet choice
when the logarithm of the odds of being correct is below a fixed threshold, q,
indicated by the black contours which divide the x, t plane into low- and high-
confidence regions. For example, the blue trial in (A), but not the green trial,
would have ended in a sure-bet choice. (C and D) The probability density of the
decision variable across time is shown for a particular motion coherence
(3.2%, i.e., weak preferred-direction motion), either without (C) or with (D) mS.
Bias in this example was set to zero for simplicity. Microstimulation shifts the
density upward, thereby decreasing the probability of a sure bet and
increasing the probability of a preferred choice (see Figure S4). A key
assumption of the model is that the brain applies the same mapping between
accumulated evidence and the expected log odds of being correct (i.e.,
confidence), and the same criteria for opting out (black contours in B–D),
irrespective of the presence of mS.
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Effects of MT Microstimulation on Choice Certaintycoherence, termed Dcoh, in one arbitrary ‘‘preferred’’ direction
(Salzman et al., 1992). We performed 42 such experiments,
using a range of Dcoh values (varied across sessions) to
approximate the range of mS effects in the main experiment.
Like mS, Dcoh trials were rewarded based on the direction of
motion that would have occurred in the absence of a coher-
ence offset. As expected, the Dcoh manipulation shifted the
pattern of direction and Ts choices by an amount similar to
the magnitude of added coherence. The results were largely
comparable to mS sessions, including similar shifts of the Ts
curve and the choice function (Figures S1B and S3B), similar
effects on direction choices with and without the Ts offer (Fig-
ure S3C; p = 0.26, paired t test), and improved sensitivity on
Ts-waived trials (Figure S3B, bottom; logistic regression, p <
1017). A notable difference from mS is the lack of an effect
on the maximum rate of Ts choices (compare Figure 2B [top]
versus inset; see below and Supplemental Experimental
Procedures).
A Common Mechanism for the Effect of
Microstimulation on Choice and Confidence
In the absence of mS, both direction choices and PDW are ex-
plained by the accumulation of noisy evidence bearing on the800 Neuron 83, 797–804, August 20, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.direction of motion (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009) (Figure 4A). The
model assumes that (1) a direction choice is based on the sign
of the accumulated evidence and (2) a sure-bet choice super-
sedes a direction choice if the odds that the direction choice
will be correct are less than a criterion, q (Figure 4B). The latter
requires the brain to have implicit knowledge of the association
between the accumulated evidence, termed a decision variable
(DV), and the likelihood that a decision based on this evidence
will be correct. We fit this model to the monkey’s direction and
Ts choices on no-mS trials (Figure 2B, top and bottom, blue sym-
bols) and then incorporated the effect of mS as a perturbation of
the evidence, equivalent to a change inmotion coherence and/or
a change in sensory noise (see Supplemental Experimental Pro-
cedures). The parameters implementing mS were fit using only
the Ts choices on mS trials (Figure 2B, top, red symbols). We
then used the fitted parameters to predict the pattern of direction
choices on mS trials, both with andwithout the Ts option available
(Figure 2B, bottom, red filled and open symbols). Importantly, we
did not allow mS to alter the association between DV and
Table 1. Maximum-LikelihoodEstimatesofModelParameters,±SE
mS Data Set
(n = 53,134 Trials)
Dcoh Data Set
(n = 43,054 Trials)
a 0.294 ± 0.001 0.291 ± 0.002
B 31.6 ± 1.30 31.2 ± 1.00
g 0.0134 ± 0.0002 0.0224 ± 0.0002
q 0.609 ± 0.004 0.507 ± 0.004
dC 0.112 ± 0.001 0.173 ± 0.001
ds2 0.237 ± 0.015 0.039 ± 0.006
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Effects of MT Microstimulation on Choice Certaintyconfidence or the criterion for selecting Ts (i.e., q). This strategy
formalizes the qualitative assertion that mS-induced changes in
neural activity are processed like vision-induced changes in neu-
ral activity. In other words, the brain does not know that it is being
stimulated.
The model fits and predictions are shown by the smooth
curves in Figure 2B (and dashed curves in Figures 1B–1D).
They capture several key features of the data: (1) the relationship
between Ts choices and trial difficulty (i.e., motion strength and
viewing duration; Figures 1B and 2B, top, blue curve), (2) the
improvement in sensitivity when Ts was offered but waived (Fig-
ure 2B, bottom: solid versus dashed curves; Figures 1C and 1D),
and (3) the main effects of mS on choice and PDW (Figure 2B,
horizontal shift of red versus blue curves).
Not surprisingly, the model explains the results from the
Dcoh experiment as well (Figure S3B), but it also helps
explain the key discrepancy between the effects of Dcoh and
microstimulation. For the mS experiments, an adjustment to
the variance of the DV (ds2 ; Equation S8; Supplemental Exper-
imental Procedures) largely accounted for the small decrease in
sensitivity to motion on mS trials (Table 1), whereas this adjust-
ment was negligible for the Dcoh manipulation, which did not
affect sensitivity to motion (p = 0.68, logistic regression). Inter-
estingly, the added variance also explains the apparent in-
crease in confidence (decrease in Ts choices) associated with
stimuli near the point of maximum ambiguity (Figure 2B, top,
red curve). It may seem counterintuitive that an increase in vari-
ance (i.e., sensory noise) would predict an increase in confi-
dence, but it is readily explained in our framework because
dispersion of the DV away from the starting level causes
more of its density to lie outside the region for opting out of
the direction decision (see Rahnev et al., 2012 for a similar
explanation).
We considered and rejected several alternative models, the
most important of which allow for the possibility that mS in-
duces a change in either the mapping of the DV to confidence
or the criterion—applied to this mapping—for opting out. Spe-
cifically, we relaxed the assumption that the criterion (q) was
unaffected by mS. This is important because allowing mS to
affect q is tantamount to accepting that mS induces a change
in neural activity that is processed qualitatively differently
than activity caused by visual motion. We found that this exten-
sion was not justified for the main data set (see Supplemental
Experimental Procedures). Note that the effects of mS on
choice (Figure 2B, bottom, solid and dashed red curves) were
predictions of the model, based on the fit to the rest of thedata. The impressive agreement to data leads us to conclude
that microstimulation did not alter the quantitative relationship
between the neural representation of evidence and its mapping
to a degree of certainty. In this way, the modeling exercise sup-
ports a unified theory of choice, confidence, and—by extension
to previous work (Ditterich et al., 2003; Hanks et al., 2006)—re-
action time.
DISCUSSION
Cortical microstimulation in behaving monkeys has long been a
fruitful approach for exposing causal relationships between
neural activity and perception (Bartlett and Doty, 1980; Doty,
1965). The power of the technique lies in its ability to link the
functional properties of sensory neurons (e.g., direction selec-
tivity in MT/MST) with psychophysical performance, as shown
previously in several brain areas and tasks (Afraz et al., 2006;
DeAngelis et al., 1998; Gu et al., 2012; Romo et al., 1998; Salz-
man et al., 1990). However, subjects in these studies typically
report only a primary decision about the sensory stimulus.
Here we have stimulated direction-selective neurons while
allowing monkeys to report something additional about the de-
cision process: their confidence, or lack thereof, in the choice.
We found that mS affected confidence as if there were an offset
to the visual evidence supporting the choice. The results sup-
port a quantitative framework in which confidence emerges
from the same basic mechanism—bounded evidence accumu-
lation—that successfully accounts for choice and reaction time.
Thus, combined with previous studies (Ditterich et al., 2003;
Salzman et al., 1990), there is now experimental evidence
that links the activity of neurons in extrastriate visual cortex
in a causal fashion to all three pillars of choice behavior (Vick-
ers, 1979).
Some might wonder whether this is in any way surprising,
given what we know from previous work (Bisley et al., 2001;
Ditterich et al., 2003; Romo et al., 1998; Salzman et al.,
1992). In fact, our study could have turned out differently
because microstimulation induces a pattern of activity that is
quite different from that caused by visual stimulation. This
pattern could have failed to engage the same networks that
normally read out sensory information for the purpose of
computing confidence (Bach and Dolan, 2012; Barttfeld et al.,
2013). Had mS induced incongruous changes in choice and
confidence—or interfered with the improvement in sensitivity
achieved by opting out of select trials—it would not have called
into question previous findings of the effects of microstimula-
tion on choice and reaction time. In short, the linking hypothe-
sis tested here was by no means a foregone conclusion.
Indeed, one might expect confidence to rest heavily on factors
(e.g., metacognitive or affective) beyond operations on evi-
dence and its conversion to a decision, especially considering
the proposed role of higher-order structures (Kepecs et al.,
2008; Komura et al., 2013; Rounis et al., 2010). Our findings
do not directly conflict with these previous studies, but
they do support a relatively straightforward mechanism for
computing confidence in a perceptual decision (Kiani and
Shadlen, 2009)—one that is tightly linked to the decision pro-
cess itself.Neuron 83, 797–804, August 20, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 801
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Effects of MT Microstimulation on Choice CertaintyMonkeys can be trained to detect microstimulation in a num-
ber of brain areas (Histed et al., 2013; Murphey and Maunsell,
2007), and we cannot rule out the possibility that they could
detect its presence in the current study. What we do know is
that they are unable or unwilling to counteract the effects of mS
on choice (and confidence), even though doing so would in-
crease reward rate. The presence of a compensatory choice
bias against the stimulated direction (Figure 2B, bottom, right-
ward shift of blue curves; Salzman et al., 1992) further argues
that monkeys do not differentiate between mS and non-mS trials.
They do not adjust their strategy solely on mS trials but instead
adjust their bias on all trials, reducing errors caused by mS at
the cost of more errors when mS was absent. Even if mS were
detectable, our results suggest that such detection did not
disrupt the critical aspect of the decision process that estab-
lishes a level of confidence. From the perspective of downstream
brain areas, the additional perturbation caused by mS ofMT/MST
is largely equivalent to a change in the neural activity produced
by a visual stimulus.
We were able to explain the monkey’s PDW behavior using
the same bounded drift-diffusion model used to explain direc-
tion choices and RT in previous studies (Gold and Shadlen,
2007; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Link, 1992; Palmer et al.,
2005; Smith and Vickers, 1988). The model exploits the associ-
ation between the DV and the probability that a choice based on
that DV will be correct, predicting a sure-bet choice when this
probability is below a fixed threshold. This model can explain
the principal effects of mS by treating it as an offset to the mo-
tion strength (Figures 2B and S4). Importantly, the model ex-
plains the assignment of confidence in a single decision based
on an evolving DV. An alternative is that the monkey identifies
the motion coherence and opts out with some frequency based
on a learned association between coherence and the probabil-
ity of being correct. However, this interpretation is contradicted
by the improvement in performance—for all motion strengths
and durations—on trials where the sure bet was offered and
waived. The improvement implies that the brain is opting out
selectively, based on a prediction that the decision reached
during motion viewing is likely to be correct. The observation
is also incompatible with other alternatives, such as selecting
Ts following lapses of attention or evading the motion decision
entirely on some fraction of trials (i.e., wishing for Ts and simply
guessing if it does not become available). Importantly, the
model explains the degree of improvement with impressive
fidelity (Figure 2B, bottom, blue curves) and is able to predict
the similar pattern on mS trials (Figure 2B, bottom, red curves)
based on a fit to the other features of the data (see Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures). The fact that this improve-
ment is preserved on mS trials is notable and could not have
been predicted from previous work. It suggests that a rather
sophisticated capacity to assess the reliability of sensory evi-
dence is maintained despite the unnatural pattern of neural ac-
tivity induced by mS.
In addition to shifting the sure-bet curve, mS also slightly
reduced the peak rate of Ts choices (Figure 2B, top). The lack
of such an effect in the Dcoh control experiment (Figure 2B,
top, inset) suggests that this is a consequence of mS itself rather
than any analysis method or incidental feature of the task, such802 Neuron 83, 797–804, August 20, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.as reward contingencies or the compensatory bias. The change
in peak Ts frequency can be explained if we assume that mS af-
fects both the signal and the noise of the sensory representation.
In the context of bounded evidence accumulation, adding noise
effectively increases the likelihood that the DV will diffuse away
from zero (i.e., neutrality) and beyond the threshold for waiving
Ts. This explanation is also consistent with the small decrease
in sensitivity associated with mS. Note that an effect on noise is
distinct from the proposed mechanism by which high-current
stimulation reduces perceptual sensitivity (Figures 3 and S2;
see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). The latter is
believed to result from the spread of current to multiple columns
with different preferred directions (Murasugi et al., 1993)—a dilu-
tion of signal rather than an increase in noise. Even low-current
stimulation may spread across columns in some cases, but the
changes in confidence that we observed suggest an effect on
noise per se, the mechanism of which remains unknown. This
subtle effect notwithstanding, a key conclusion from the model
is that mS does not influence higher-level aspects of decision
strategy, such as the internal mapping between the state of the
accumulated evidence and the likelihood of making a correct
choice.
It seems uncontroversial that signals in the visual cortex would
affect both choice and certainty, but it is remarkable that the
coupling should be so well explained by a common mechanism.
After all, certainty and confidence invite consideration of temper-
ament, mood, and subjective experience about the decision pro-
cess itself (e.g., metacognition). Thus, it is noteworthy that the
monkeys did not exercise the option to indicate that something
was peculiar about the decision process on trials accompanied
by mS. In effect, the monkeys have communicated just the oppo-
site: they ‘‘wager’’ as if they experienced a change in the visual
stimulus. Moreover, the high-current mS experiments (Figure 3A)
reassure us that the monkey is in fact able to use PDW to report
decreased confidence when it occurs. Of course, we do not
know what monkeys experience subjectively when we stimulate
the brain, nor can we interrogate the subjective feeling of cer-
tainty itself. That said, any neuroscientific investigation is unlikely
to furnish this level of explanation. What seems certain is that a
quantitative reconciliation of choice, RT, and confidencewill pro-
vide a basis for extending the neurobiology of decisionmaking to
more complex situations in which confidence itself plays a
critical role.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Behavioral Task
Two adult male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were trained to perform a
direction discrimination task with postdecision wagering (PDW), as described
previously (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009). The task (Figure 1A) was to determine the
net direction of motion in a circular patch of dynamic random dots. Motion
could be in one of two directions separated by 180, and difficulty was
controlled by varying both the viewing duration (truncated exponential distri-
bution, mean = 270 ms, range = 60–880 ms) and the percentage of coherently
moving dots (motion coherence: 0%, 3.2%, 6.4%, 12.8%, 25.6%, or 51.2%).
After acquiring central fixation, two direction-choice targets appeared on
opposite sides of the fixation point (9–12 eccentricity), followed by the
random dot motion display. After motion offset, the monkey maintained fixa-
tion through a variable delay period (range = 500–1,000 ms), during which a
third target (the sure-bet target [Ts]) appeared on a random half of trials.
Neuron
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least 500 ms after stimulus offset, strongly encouraging them to complete a
direction decision on all trials. Ts differed in color and size from the direc-
tion-choice targets andwas positioned at an angle perpendicular to themotion
axis at 6–8 eccentricity.
After the delay period, the fixation point disappeared, cueing the monkey to
make a saccadic eye movement to one of the targets. When given the oppor-
tunity, the monkey could choose Ts and receive a guaranteed reward (drop of
water or juice) or waive Ts andmake the higher-stakes direction choice. Correct
direction choices yielded a larger liquid reward than Ts choices, while errors re-
sulted in a 5–6 s timeout. The ratio of Ts reward size to direction-choice reward
size (0.75–0.82 for monkey I, 0.64–0.72 for monkey D) was chosen to
encourage the animals to choose Ts approximately 50% of the time at the
weakest motion strengths. The ratio was not adjusted during the course of
an experiment.
Surgery and Neurophysiological Methods
All procedures were in accordance with National Institutes of Health guide-
lines and approved by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees at
the University of Washington and Columbia University. Animals were im-
planted with a head post and recording chamber using aseptic surgical
methods. Electrical microstimulation and multiunit recordings were made
with tungsten electrodes (Alpha Omega, impedance = 0.5–2 MU measured
at 1 kHz). Areas MT (n = 32 sites) and MST (n = 31) were identified using struc-
tural MRI scans and standard physiological criteria, as well as histological
analysis in one animal. Stimulation sites were chosen based on strong direc-
tion selectivity and consistent tuning (across 200 mm of cortex) for the direc-
tion, speed, and size of the motion stimulus (see Supplemental Experimental
Procedures for details).
Once we encountered an acceptable site, we positioned the electrode tip
near its center and began the discrimination task. On a random half of trials,
including both Ts-present and Ts-absent trials, microstimulation was deliv-
ered through the recording electrode using a Grass S88 stimulator with two
PSIU6 optical isolation units (Grass Technologies). Stimulation trains con-
sisted of square-wave, biphasic pulses with the following parameters: 5,
7.5, or 10 mA; 200, 250, or 333 Hz, 0.4 ms negative and 0.4 ms positive phase
(negative phase leading). Within these ranges, no systematic effects of pulse
amplitude or frequency were detected. The pulses began 40 ms after motion
onset and stopped 40 ms after motion offset to account for visual response
latency. For eight sites in one monkey, following the standard block of trials,
an additional block was collected in which the amplitude of pulses was
increased to 75 mA (‘‘high-current’’) while all other parameters remained the
same. Note that our pulse duration (0.4 ms) was longer than in previous
studies by a factor of 1.33 (Ditterich et al., 2003) or 2 (Murasugi et al., 1993;
Salzman et al., 1992).
We performed a set of control experiments with the same task design and
stimuli, except that electrical microstimulation was replaced with an offset to
the motion coherence assigned by the computer on a given trial (dubbed
‘‘added-signal’’ trials in Salzman et al., 1992). The coherence offset (Dcoh)
was fixed for a given session and varied from 5%–40% coh across sessions
(see Figures S1B and S1C).
Behavioral Data Analysis
We fit the direction choices to the logistic regression model given by:
Ppref =

1+ eQ
1
; Q= b0 + b1IE + b2C (Equation 1)
where Ppref is the probability of a preferred-direction choice, C is signed
motion coherence, IE is an indicator variable for mS (1 or 0 for trials with/
without mS), b0 is the overall bias, b1 estimates the effect of mS on the direc-
tion choice, and b1/b2 expresses this in units of motion coherence. Fitting
was performed by the method of maximum likelihood (binomial error), with
SEs of the parameters obtained from the inverted Hessian matrix. SEs
were used to compute t statistics and thereby evaluate the null hypothesis
(e.g., b1 = 0). Effects of mS on choice were similar between MT and MST
(two-sample K-S test, p = 0.39); thus, we pooled the data from the two areas
for all analyses.To quantify the change in sensitivity associated with mS, we fit the logistic
model given by:
Ppref =

1+ eQ
1
; Q= b0 +b1IE + b2C+ b3IEC (Equation 2)
where b3 captures the effect on sensitivity. Similarly, the difference in sensi-
tivity with and without Ts present (Figure 2B, bottom) was examined by replac-
ing IE in Equation 2 with an indicator term for Ts.
For some analyses, we fit the probability of sure-bet choices as function of
signed coherence with a Gaussian function (Supplemental Experimental Pro-
cedures, Equations S1 and S2). Note that the smooth curves in Figures 2B, 3,
S2A, and S3 were generated from the bounded accumulation models (see
below), not logistic regression or Gaussian fitting. For additional methods
and results related to the Gaussian fits, see Supplemental Experimental
Procedures.
Model Fits and Predictions
Here we provide an intuitive overview of the model (Figure 4) and fits displayed
in Figures 1B–1D, 2B, and S3B. Variables constituting degrees of freedom are
identified by bold font and listed in Table 1. For mathematical details, see Sup-
plemental Experimental Procedures.
We explain choice and PDW using a simplified one-dimensional diffusion
process (Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Link, 1992;
Ratcliff and Rouder, 1998; Smith and Vickers, 1988) in which noisy
evidence favoring either direction (and against the other) is accumulated
for its display duration or until the process reaches an upper or lower
bound, ±B. The bounds would explain reaction time in other contexts,
whereas here they render decision times shorter than the display duration
on some trials, and they affect the predicted accuracy on these trials
(Kiani et al., 2008). The accumulation has a drift and a diffusion component.
The latter is the accumulation of independent random numbers at each
time step. The drift is a line with slope (drift rate) proportional to the
motion coherence (aC), where the sign of C indicates direction. The sign
of the accumulated evidence, termed the decision variable (x), determines
the choice. Confidence, in turn, is the log odds that such a choice
would be correct. It is a function of both x and time (i.e., the stimulus
duration or the time that the accumulation reached a bound). The time
dependence arises because the reliability of the evidence (motion strength)
varies unpredictably across trials and is not explicitly known by the
observer (Drugowitsch et al., 2014; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009). When Ts is
offered, we assert that the monkey exercises or waives this option based
on a criterion, q, applied to the log odds of being correct (Figures 4B–4D).
The model generates the expected probability of each option by propagat-
ing and integrating the probability density of the decision variable within
different regions of this space, as partitioned by q and the bounds (Figures
4C and 4D).
On trials with mS, we assume that the drift rate is offset by dC, equivalent to a
change in the motion coherence, and allow for the possibility that the diffusion
noise is also affected (offset by ds2 ). On all trials, the drift rate includes an addi-
tional offset term g to account for the compensatory bias that arises in micro-
stimulation experiments (Salzman et al., 1992).
We employed a simple parameterization and tiered fitting strategy de-
signed to minimize the number of degrees of freedom of the model (see Sup-
plemental Experimental Procedures). We pursued this strategy to guard
against over fitting and to support intuitions about the neural mechanisms.
The model furnishes the smooth curves in the analyses of the main data
set (low current mS) and the Dcoh control (Figures 2B and S3B, respectively;
see also Figure S4), as well as the dashed curves in Figures 1B–1D. A more
elaborate model, also described in the Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures, was required to explain the effects of high current stimulation (Figures
3 and S2).
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